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Abstract  
Following the emergence of file-sharing networks such as Napster and BitTorrent, 
the record industry has tended to regard peer-to-peer networks in a negative light. 
This is hardly surprising: in the terms of Yochai Benkler, such networks provided 
‘technological shock’ but not ‘economic sustainability’, at least form an industry 
perspective. Some have seen recent technological developments as revolutionary, 
but it is a revolution only in potential: though music can be recorded and distributed 
more easily than ever, there remains a crisis in terms of attribution and monetisation 
that the Sisyphean ‘war on copyright’ seems unlikely to solve. Royalty payments in 
the streaming era, meanwhile, are slow, inefficient and enormously complex. A 
twentieth century, industrial information model, then, remains dominant, although the 
apparently inexorable overall decline in income from recorded music is gradually 
reducing it to a mere husk.  
 
This paper suggests that blockchain technology, which, like Napster and BitTorrent, 
harnesses the power of peer-to-peer networks, could represent a more sustainable 
model, realising the revolutionary potential of disintermediation and direct-to-fan 
models to facilitate a shift to what, with a nod to Benkler’s ‘networked information 
economy’, might be called the networked record industry. As well as exploring the 
workings of distributed ledger technology, this article outlines the transformation it 
could bring about in determining the authorship and attribution of recorded music; 
enabling asset transfers and the tracking of provenance; allowing artists to determine 
their own pricing and terms of use for their music; facilitating licensing through 
metadata; introducing frictionless, near-instant micropayments for streaming and 
downloads. The broader themes of the networked record industry – 
disintermediation, transparency and the nexus of control – are also explored, as well 
as barriers to adoption.  
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Introduction: the challenges facing recorded music 
In recent years, the focus of research into digital currencies such as Bitcoin has 
begun to extend from the currencies themselves (Grinberg 2011; Kaplanov 2012; 
Barber et al 2012; Selgin 2013; Brito and Castillo 2013; Yermack 2014; Evans 2014; 
Dwyer 2014; Böhme et al 2015; Antonopoulos 2015) to the underlying distributed 
ledger – or blockchain – technology (Swan 2015; Pilkington 2015; Kiviat 2015; 
Tsilidou and Foroglou 2015; Peters and Panayi 2015; Schatsky and Muraskin 2015; 
Walport 2016). The focus of this attention, however, tends to be on technical and 
regulatory aspects of the technology, or its potential for the financial sector: so-called 
‘fintech’. There is a clear gap in the literature on blockchain technology as it relates to 
the music – and, more broadly, all creative – industries. The use of blockchain 
technology to manage and track online payments for music was advocated in a 
recent Rethink Music report (2015). The author of this paper also included a very 
brief discussion of blockchain technology in a review of collaborative, co-operative 
and collective business models in the ‘new’ music industries (O’Dair 2015). Given the 
attention the issue has received in the media, however, it is clear that the subject 
requires further academic attention.  
 
Globally, the music industries are worth an estimated $45 billion, of which 
approximately $15 billion relates to recorded music (Rethink Music 2015). ‘Record 
business’ and ‘music business’, it is important to note, are not synonymous, and 
Williamson and Cloonan (2007) point out that it is more useful to speak of ‘music 
industries’ in the plural. This article focuses specifically on recorded music, however, 
since this is the area that has been most obviously affected by recent technological 
developments. It is also the record industry that, some suggest, could be most 
affected by the emergence of blockchain technology.  
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As well as being enormously important, both economically and culturally, in their own 
right, the music industries can be seen as the ‘canary in the coalmine’ in terms of 
broader economic developments. Attali (1985) pointed out that musicians have been 
on the cutting edge of economic developments since the eighteenth century, when a 
new entrepreneurialism among composers signaled the end of patronage. Music, he 
suggested, was ‘prophetic’ (p4), the herald of society, ‘for change is inscribed in 
noise faster than it transforms society’ (p5). Music, then, can anticipate broader 
socio-economic changes: if blockchain technology has the potential to transform 
industries relating to recorded music, it could produce equally bold changes – of the 
sort Christensen and Raynor (2003) call ‘disruptive innovation’ – in other industries 
as well.  
 
To assume that technological change in terms of the production and consumption of 
recorded music has been disrupting, rather than enabling, is to adopt a record label 
perspective – in particular, a major record label perspective. Opinions vary, however, 
as to the extent of that change. Some (Hughes and Lang 2003; Dubosson-Torbay et 
al 2004; Kusek and Leonhard 2005; Knopper 2009) claim digital technology has 
brought about a ‘revolution’ in the music industries. Others (Thompson et al 2009; 
Campos 2012; Moyon and Lecoq 2013; Rethink Music 2013; Rogers 2013) regard 
any changes brought about by digital technology as part of a much less dramatic 
process of evolution. Arditti (2015) has even suggested that the ‘digital revolution’ 
has allowed major labels to strengthen their control over music production and 
consumption. 
 
Though these might sound like contradictory arguments, my own take is that there is 
a sense in which both camps are correct. There has indeed been a revolution but it is 
a revolution in potential – potential that has not, as yet, been realised. This is the 
scenario outlined by Yochai Benkler, Professor of Entrepreneurial Legal Studies at 
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Harvard University, in his 2006 book The Wealth of Networks. Benkler saw that the 
twentieth-century ‘industrial information model’, as represented by the recording 
industry among others, could give way to a ‘networked information economy’ (pp 31-
2). The recording industry, Benkler suggests, is typical of a shift from commercial, 
concentrated business models towards nonproprietary appropriation strategies; the 
fact that high capital investment up front is no longer required has removed a 
significant barrier to entry. Fundamental to this shift is the notion of the network. The 
key point about Napster and BitTorrent, Benkler argues, is not that they infringed 
copyright: that is merely ‘the narrow perspective of the law of copyright or of the 
business model of the recording industry’ (p84). ‘The broader point to take from 
looking at peer-to-peer file-sharing networks, however, is the sheer effectiveness of 
large-scale collaboration among individuals once they possess, under their individual 
control, the physical capacity necessary to make their co-operation effective’ (p85).  
  
Those (Owsinski 2009; Feehan and Chertkow 2009; Borreau et al 2008; Dolata 
2011; Preston and Rogers 2013) who see artists as empowered by recent 
technological developments, then, are correct, in that it has never been easier to 
record and disseminate music without a record label. Since everyone else is also 
able to record and disseminate music, however, competition is colossal, with the 
result that most artists remain far down in what Anderson (2009) would call ‘the long 
tail’. Those artists not primarily motivated by material gain might be content with such 
a scenario: Benkler (2006) questions the baseline conception that proprietary 
strategies are dominant in our information production system, pointing to voluntarism 
and actions orientated primarily toward social-psychological motivations rather than 
market appropriation (pp460-1).  
 
The direct-to-fan model tends to fall down, however, for those artists who wish to 
operate on a commercially viable basis. Despite claims of a do-it-yourself musical 
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era, examples of genuinely DIY commercial success remain elusive (Hesmondalgh 
2013). To achieve commercial success, most artists – emerging artists in particular – 
still require the clout of a record label (or groups acting like record labels, perhaps 
backed by venture capital) and probably other intermediaries as well, for instance 
collection societies and streaming and download platforms. Even such high-profile 
advocates of the direct-to-fan approach as Trent Reznor of the band Nine Inch Nails, 
the band Radiohead and the solo artist Amanda Palmer (Wikström 2013) all began 
on major labels. Having self-released his 2008 album Ghosts I-IV to considerable 
fanfare, Reznor actually returned to a major label, Colombia, for subsequent 
releases. And while Radiohead and Amanda Palmer remain independent, it can be 
argued that they can afford to do so only because of the fanbase each had already 
built up while signed to a major label.  
 
A viable alternative to the traditional, industrial information model, then, has yet to 
emerge. Yet that model is hardly satisfactory. While the shift to legal downloads and 
streaming may appear positive when compared to the earlier phase of peer-to-peer 
network ‘piracy’ (Watson 2015), streaming, in particular, has brought with it a major 
data challenge. Rights owners, who once needed to track only every sale, now find 
themselves obliged to know every single time a track is listened to – and to keep 
track of revenue streams in fractions of pennies (Cooke 2015). This challenge is 
compounded by the fact that there is no single database that documents ownership 
of all song and recording copyrights. Instead, there are numerous databases, none 
entirely comprehensive; particularly for co-owned works, information can actually 
vary between one database and another, with no central authority to settle conflicts.  
 
Though it has been joined by a crisis in data relating to legal streaming, the crisis in 
the illegal consumption of music, a major issue since the emergence of CD and, in 
particular, MP3 technology, has not disappeared. The British Phonographic Industry 
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recently announced that it has issued in excess of 200 million ‘takedown’ notices to 
web addresses featuring illegal music, reflecting a game of legal whack-a-mole that 
is surely unwinnable. What should we do, Lessig (2008) asks rhetorically, if this ‘war 
on piracy’ cannot be won? Enforcing copyright is important, he goes on, but 
‘criminalisng an entire generation is too high a price to pay’ (p xviii). Further 
complicating the challenge is the emergence of the ‘read-write culture’ that Lessig 
documents in his 2008 book Remix and to which Benkler (2006) also alludes:  
 
‘We are seeing the possibility of an emergence of a new popular culture, 
produced on the folk-culture model and inhabited actively rather than 
passively consumed by the masses… the practical capacity individuals and 
noncommercial actors have to use and manipulate cultural artifacts today, 
playfully or critically, far outstrips anything possible in television, film or 
recorded music as these were organised throughout the twentieth century’ 
(pp 275-7).  
 
The use and manipulation of cultural artifacts – what Balkin (2004) calls ‘glomming 
on – might include unauthorised sampling, remixes, ‘mash-ups’i and ‘shreds’ii. Like 
other user-generated content such as cover versions, these forms typically remain 
unidentified and unmonetised on streaming platforms. As Romer (1990) pointed out, 
the move from tangible to intangible, information products or ‘instructions’ represents 
a fundamental shift since, once the cost of creating a new set of instructions has 
been incurred, the instructions can be used over and over again at no additional cost. 
Property law, struggling to keep pace with the shift to ‘instructions’, feels increasingly 
outmoded in the ‘intangible economy’ (Moringiello 2007). Benkler (2006) regards the 
current battles over intellectual property as representative of ‘a concerted effort to 
shape the institutional ecology in order to help proprietary models of information 
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production at the expense of burdening nonmarket, nonproprietary production’ 
(p381). In other words, it is an attempt to resist the networked information economy.  
 
While the old recording industry model lumbers on, then, it can be considered 
increasingly husk-like: though it might appear, from the outside, to be as robust as 
during its twentieth-century heyday, the twenty-first-century incarnation is in fact 
brittle and increasingly hollow. Though other revenue streams are certainly available, 
the general decline in income from recorded music is undeniable (Ingham 2015). The 
record industry continues to operate on the ‘industrial information model’, unable to 
adapt to the fact that a digital piece of music is non-rivalrous and has a zero marginal 
cost. This applies not only to record labels, but to publishers and collection societies 
as well.  
 
It is important to understand that any piece of recorded music contains not one but 
two copyrights: one for the sound recording itself and one for underlying words and 
music. ‘The sound recording is created by the artist/performer and usually monetised 
by the record label, while the musical composition is created by songwriters and 
lyricists and monetised by music publishers’ (Rethink Music 2015, p10). Currently, in 
the UK, PPL (who collect artists’ equitable remuneration right on performance rights 
income, part of the recording copyright) pay once a year; PRS (who collect 
performing rights of the song copyright) pay quarterly; publishers and labels, 
meanwhile, typically pay every six months. Particularly for international uses, 
royalties can take years to reach the bank accounts of rights holders – by which point 
more than one more performance rights organisation may have deducted 
administrative fees (Rethink Music 2015, p20). Given that tracks can be downloaded 
or streamed anywhere in the world at the click of a mouse, such a model seems 
archaic.  
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Furthermore, ‘significant funds are often paid to the wrong party’ (Rethink Music 
2015, p3) while ‘large pools of royalty revenue end up outside the artist’s reach in a 
so-called “black box” – where rightful owners of royalty revenue cannot be accurately 
identified because of a lack of an industry-wide system for tying usage to ownership’ 
(p4). The specific details of many streaming deals are actually kept secret by non-
disclosure agreements, so that artists and songwriters may not know the terms under 
which copyrights are being used. This makes it difficult for them to audit royalties and 
to assess whether labels, publishers or CMOs are processing payments efficiently 
(Cooke 2015). And yet, in the absence of commercially viable DIY models, in 
particular for those near the start of their careers artists find themselves obliged to 
work with this husk, to take it on trust that intermediaries are passing on the correct 
payments and are doing so as fast as they can. While there is no implication that any 
one organisation or industry sector is being actively dishonest, there are sectors of 
the industry that benefit from the opacity of the current system – and it is worth noting 
that major labels have equity ownership shares in most streaming services (Rethink 
Music 2015). 
 
 
Enter the blockchain  
Claims in the media for blockchain technology as a solution to many of the 
challenges outlined above have been bold. This technology, it has been suggested, 
could ‘revolutionise’ the music industry (Wallach 2014; Perez 2015), could even 
‘save the music business in 2016’ (Guez 2015). Gottfried, meanwhile suggests that 
blockchain technology ‘can help solve virtually all of the challenges the music 
industry currently faces’ (2015a). Peertracks, Aurovine, Bittunes and UjoMusic are 
among those exploring the potential of blockchain technology for recorded music, 
while the British singer, songwriter and producer Imogen Heap has proposed 
perhaps the most ambitious usage to date: a platform entitled Mycelia which ‘holds 
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all music related information ever recorded anywhere ever ever ever’ (Howard 
2015a), operating on ‘fair trade’ principles. Although still in its early stages, the 
proposal has seen Heap hailed as the ‘saviour of the music industry’ (Bartlett 2015).  
 
Though such claims may seem excessive, blockchain technology could indeed bring 
about a dramatic transformation, not least by removing the need for artists to trust 
intermediaries to pay royalties fairly and efficiently – both because transparency is 
one of the fundamental properties of distributed ledgers and because payments 
would no longer need to pass through intermediaries at all. That, however, is only 
one part of its appeal, as this article will go on to suggest. It could enable the shift to 
a networked information economy for recorded music, one based on the ‘mesh’ 
structure of distributed networks, rather than the ‘star’ structure of centralised or 
hierarchical systems (Baran 1964).  
 
Benkler (2006) identified such an economy – the result of ‘technological shock’ 
coupled with ‘economic sustainability of the emerging social practices’ (p34) – as 
nothing more than a possible or potential future, not the guaranteed consequence of 
the adoption of networked computers. In the emergence of digital music recordings, 
most obviously MP3s, and the ability to share those recordings via peer-to-peer 
networks, recorded music has already experienced one such ‘technological shock’. It 
was not, however, accompanied by economic sustainability, at least not for record 
labels and other intermediaries. Though he regarded peer-to-peer file-sharing 
networks as a genuine threat to the traditional recording industry, Benkler (2006) 
insisted that ‘musicians and songwriters seem to be relatively insulated from the 
effects of p2p networks, and on balance, are probably affected positively’ (p426). 
This was because he assumed that musicians’ income derived primarily from other 
revenue streams, such as concerts and merchandise. This is open to debate; it is 
also, given its specific focus on recorded music, largely beyond the scope of this 
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article. In terms of recorded music alone, the binary opposition that Benkler and 
many others assume, between artists and songwriters on the one hand and industry 
representatives on the other hand, is only partially accurate: the steady decline in 
overall revenue has a negative effect on both.    
 
Blockchain technology, which represents another ‘technological shock’, albeit one 
still built on peer-to-peer networks, is potentially transformative because – unlike 
previous, ‘pirate’ peer-to-per file-sharing music networks – it brings with it the 
potential of economic sustainability. This article will go on to outline ways in which 
blockchain technology could facilitate a shift to the ‘radically decentralised’ networked 
information economy that Benkler foresaw, specifically in relation to recorded music. 
First, however, a few words about the technology itself.  
 
Although cryptocurrency literature has a long history – see, for instance, Chaum 
(1983) – the ‘genesis block’iii of blockchain technology literature is a 2008 paper 
apparently by Satoshi Nakamotoiv. Bitcoin was interesting for various reasons, not 
least its use of public-key cryptography. According to Fairfield (2014b), however, this 
was not the digital currency’s most important innovation; that was the invention of 
blockchain technology: 
 
‘The blockchain is a chain of transactions. All transactions during a ten-
minute block of time are gathered by third parties (termed “miners”…v) into a 
discrete “block” of transactions. Once the transactions in a given block are 
verifiably baked into the overall list of transactions, they become the latest 
block of transactions in a chain of blocks, hence the term block chain’ (p18). 
 
Many (Brito and Castillo 2013; Evans 2014; Kiviat 2015; Tschorsch and 
Scheuermann 2015) now believe that is this degree of decentralisation, achieved via 
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blockchain technology that makes Bitcoin so unusual. Rather than requiring a trusted 
third-party intermediary, Nakamoto’s currency solves the double spending problem 
inherent in digital currencies by distributing the necessary ledger among all the users 
of the system via a peer-to-peer network. As Forte et al (2015) point out, this 
decentralised transaction ledger functionality can be used not only for 
cryptocurrencies but to register, confirm and transfer any kind of contract and 
property. Bitcoin, then, may be ‘the tip of an iceberg’ for blockchain technology 
(Fairfield 2014a, p38). Some (Swan 2015; Wright and De Fillippi 2015; HM Treasury 
2015) regard the emergence of the technology as analogous to the arrival of the 
Internet. 
 
Crucial to the potential of this technology is the notion of smart contracts, a concept 
in particular associated with the Ethereum blockchainvi. First envisaged by Szabo 
(1997), smart contracts have gained a ‘second wind’ with the emergence of 
blockchain technology. These contracts – which enable the automated transfer of 
digital assets upon certain triggering conditions – represent a new and interesting 
form of organising contractual activity (Fairfield 2014a, pp38-9). What makes smart 
contracts unusual is that, by making use of programmable, self-enforcing blockchain 
transactions, they allow contractual relationships to be automatically executed 
without the additional costs of monitoring or enforcement (Kiviat 2015, p606). Wright 
and De Filippi (2015) go as far as to suggest that smart contracts are ‘one of the first 
truly disruptive technological advancements to the practice of law since the invention 
of the printing press’ (p10). Also important is the notion of ‘smart properties’ (Forte et 
al 2015), which enable ownership rights for a given asset to be asserted through 
registration on the blockchain, secured by means of a private key (p5). Smart 
property, cryptographically defined property rights that are self-enforced by code, is 
also ‘a completely new kind of concept’, with ‘wide implications for property law’ 
(Swan 2015, p15).  
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To date, the industries that have shown most interest in these concepts are those 
associated with banking and finance. Yet digital currencies and their associated 
blockchains have the potential to disrupt – and enable – numerous other industries, 
from ride-sharing to online gambling. Blockchain technology has the potential to 
finally change the economic model for recorded music too. The new model this 
technology could enable – a networked record industry, to borrow from Benkler – 
would not attempt to fight peer-to-peer technology. Since Napster and BitTorrent, 
these networks are commonly depicted as ‘the enemy’, the more recent incarnation 
being unauthorised postings on sites such as Youtube. And yet fighting these sites in 
the face of social and technological trends, as both Benkler and Lessig suggest, is a 
Sisyphean task. Instead, a genuinely networked record industry could use smart 
contracts and smart property to enable reliable attribution and claims of authorship; 
to facilitate asset transfer and track provenance; to allow flexible pricing and terms of 
use; to facilitate licensing through metadata; and to enable frictionless, near-instant 
micropayments. 
 
Authorship and attribution 
 
Fairfield (2014b) sees blockchain technology as ‘a revolution in how to keep track of 
rights’ (p4). The technology provides the ability to digitise and securely store 
information on practically any asset, from diamonds to bags of rice, allowing 
organisations to identify and track their ownership and location (Godsiff 2016, p57). 
The web-based service Proof of Existence, for instance, uses blockchain technology 
to anonymously and securely record proof of existence for any document. 
Essentially, the ‘hash’ function – converting a file into a compressed string of 
alphanumeric characters that cannot be back-computed into the original content, by 
means of a computer algorithm (Swan 2015) – creates a kind of cryptographic one-
way-street, allowing creators of creative content to prove authorship and to prove 
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that a creative work existed at a given time without revealing the actual contents 
(Tsilidou and Foroglou 2015). The company Ascribe, for instance, allows visual 
artists to claim authorship for a work, timestamping that claim onto the blockchain 
along with a unique cryptographic ID.  
 
In terms of recorded music, authorship of a song could be asserted by means of a 
similar unique ID, ‘baked’ into the blockchain. This might not prevent recordings 
being illegally uploaded to streaming platforms by third parties but it would at least 
mean that artists and rights holders would be properly acknowledged: Ascribe 
concede that they cannot protect your work from being copied, but they can ensure 
that work can always be traced back to its author. 
 
Peertracks, a music platform that makes use of blockchain technology, aims to give 
each file a unique ID to authenticate its origin, which is then recorded on the 
blockchain (Dovey 2015). Similarly, the platform Ujo Music aims to determine 
ownership of creative works, using a unique ID to make dub plates, remixes and flips 
instantly recognisable (Gottfried 2015b).  
  
The ability to embed an ID with a piece of recorded music would also solve a 
problem facing session musicians and other ‘behind the scenes’ contributors to 
recorded music. Even a legally streamed track will typically credit only the ‘featured 
artist’ – i.e. the ‘star’ solo artist or band – whereas physical releases, with full liner 
notes, also credit any session musicians, together with other contributors such as 
engineers and producers. Although these people still get paid under the current 
system, they are robbed of the ‘moral right’ of recognition for their work. More 
detailed credits would enhance the listener experience as well.  
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Asset transfer and provenance  
 
Fairfield (2014a, p38) suggests that ‘trustless publics ledgers’ permit parties not only 
to hold digital assets of value without banking intermediaries but also to transfer 
digital assets of value directly, on their own terms, without any institution acting as an 
exchange intermediary. As well as allowing visual artists to claim authorship of work, 
Ascribe allows artists, should they wish to do so, to transfer that intellectual property. 
Companies including Blockai and Colu offer similar services. Users, then, are able 
not only to access a transparent, immutable register of digital assets but to trade 
ownership of these assets. Once transferring and trading music copyrights becomes 
as easy as sending an email, Colu predict, a secondary market of music rights will 
flourish.  
 
This would also allow users to track the chain of ownership, or provenance. Briefly, 
each block in the blockchain contains the ‘hash’ of the preceding block within its own 
header, creating a chronological ‘chain’ of blocks stretching right back to the first 
block ever created: the genesis block (Antonopoulos 2015, p161). ‘Hashing’, Swan 
(2015) points out, allows intellectual property to be encoded into the blockchain, 
turning it into a document registry (p39) – one that records ownership history.  
 
Flexible pricing and terms of use  
Howard (2015b) cites the example of the owner of a taco shop who wants to play 
only music by a single band, the Texas Tornados, in his restaurant, yet who finds 
himself obliged ‘to buy a blanket license that gives him the right to play anything in 
the PRO’s [performance rights organisation’s] catalogue’. Howard suggests that the 
band themselves might like this idea, and might even like it so much that they would 
offer a special price to the restaurant owner, yet the ability to set a price for the use 
of their music is not currently in their power: the price is set by the American 
performance rights organisation, ASCAP. Smart contracts, by contrast, provide 
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considerable flexibility – so the restaurant owner could buy a license to play only 
music by a particular group such as the Texas Tornados, according to a set of rules 
ascribed on the blockchain.  
 
Howard’s example is hypothetical but Heap has also commented that, as an artist, 
she desires the freedom to set her own prices for her songs, even to make them free 
for a particular demographic or on a given day of the year. Heap has also suggested 
that she might want the freedom to ‘cut in’, for instance, her photographer or a 
particular charity (she can choose to pass on a share of revenue to third parties 
under the current system, of course, but blockchain technology would allow these 
payments to take place automatically and transparently at the moment of purchase). 
According to Revelator founder and CEO Bruno Guez (2015), blockchain technology 
will ‘allow for a greater range of pricing – if someone wants to pay more than $1 for a 
track, or $10 for an album, they can contribute whatever amount they want’.  
 
Smart contracts could cover the uses of a track, as well as its price. Heap (private 
conversation, 16.11.15) suggests that an artist might, for instance, elect to allow a 
small dance group use a track without charge on the basis that those terms would 
change if they to make a profit at some point in the future. Alternatively, an artist 
might choose to permit remixes of a track in return for a split of publishing. For ‘Tiny 
Human’, Heap allowed remixes but monetised them in a different way, by charging 
$45 for the ‘stems’ required to remix the track.  
 
Ujo, similarly, allows stakeholders to determine both pricing and terms of use, while 
Peertracks allows artists to write their own licenses and set their own financial return. 
As Dovey (2015) states:  
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‘The attraction for musicians to use the blockchain lies in (re)gaining control 
over their work through managing their own licenses and setting up direct 
contracts with fans that could evolve into a community of shared owners and 
producers of the work.’ 
 
 
 
Facilitating licensing through metadata 
Each piece of recorded music could be allocated more than a unique ID. Metadata 
regarding the ownership of that piece of music would help streamline what is 
currently a complex and convoluted process for those wishing to license that piece of 
music. Making it easier to locate the owners of a piece of recorded music, and to 
obtain a license to use it, is a major issue that Ujo hopes to overcome with the use of 
blockchain technology, while Mycelia also proposes to surround each piece of music 
with data relating to lyrics and photographs, for instance, as well as full credits. The 
‘ecosystem of data’ around each song will make it easier to locate the owners of a 
song to obtain a legal license to use it (Bartlett 2015). 
 
The potential of blockchain technology to keep track of music and related data has 
led some (for instance Wallach 2014) to suggest it could be used to create a single, 
universal database of music copyright. Pledge Music CEO Benji Rogers (2015) has 
proposed using the blockchain to create a giant database of recorded music: a Fair 
Trade Global Database of rights that would help solve issues of ownership, 
payments and transparency. However, the fate of the most obvious precursor, the 
Global Rights Database, reflects the scale of the task: the database collapsed in 
2014.  
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Frictionless, near-instant micropayments  
Smart contracts could allow revenue from a stream or download to be distributed 
automatically between rights holders, almost at the moment the track is downloaded. 
There are two potential benefits. One is a significant reduction in administration and 
transactional costs, linked to the low transaction costs of digital currencies (Grinberg 
2011, p170; Brito and Castillo 2013, p10) and particularly important given the small 
size of typical payments in the streaming era. As Fairfield (2014b) states, ‘minimum 
transaction costs enable microtransactions, and microtransactions enable a range of 
wealth-generating behaviour that is below the prior lower bounds of the property and 
currency systems’ (p14). ‘For online ecosystems,’ he continues, ‘transaction costs 
are everything’ (p72). As a consequence of its suitability for micropayments, 
blockchain technology brings with it the ability to ‘tip’ content creators, even in mere 
pennies, cents or Satoshisvii: the online equivalent to tossing loose change into a 
busker’s guitar case. The website ChangeTip, for instance, allows users to issue a 
small ‘tip’ to a musician whose Youtube video they have enjoyed.  Similarly, 
platforms such as Pozible – which counts musicians among its users – make use of 
the potential for micropayments inherent in digital currencies to enable miniscule 
contributions toward crowdfunding campaigns.viii  
 
As well as being ‘frictionless’, payments via smart contracts would also be 
immediate: Wright and De Filiippi (2015) suggest that smart contracts could allow 
music royalties to be administered instantaneously, with distributions provided to 
both composers and performers in real time. From a scenario in which royalties can 
take years to arrive in artists’ and songwriters’ bank accounts, this would represent a 
radical shift that could transform cash-flow for artists and songwriters.  
 
Both Wright and De Filiippi (2015) and HM Treasury (2015) see micropayments as 
fundamental to the appeal of blockchain technology for the creative industries. With 
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Imogen Heap’s single ‘Tiny Human’, available via Ujo Music as a ‘test case’ for 
blockchain technology in this field, payments were automatically distributed to the 
different contributors at the point of download or stream. On Peertracks, too, funds 
are sent directly from fans to artists at the point of download, with income 
automatically split between all copyright holders and paid within seconds.  
 
 
Themes of the networked record industry 
Taken together, changes in the authorship and attribution of recorded music, 
increased ease of licensing through the use of metadata, the ability to transfer assets 
and track provenance the introduction of frictionless, near-instant micropayments for 
streaming and downloads represent a major shift from the industrial information 
model. In broader terms, the shift to a networked record industry can be understood 
under three interrelated themes: transparency, the nexus of control and 
disintermediation.  
 
Transparency  
One of the most ingenious aspects of Bitcoin lay in solving the so-called Byzantine 
Generals’ Problem (Lampert et al 1982), essentially the problem of exchanging 
information over an unreliable and potentially compromised network. Nakamoto’s 
solution used the ‘proof-of-work’ to achieve consensus without, crucially, requiring a 
central trusted authority. Blockchain technology removes the need for trust.  
 
Through the use of smart contracts, blockchain technology could allow revenue to be 
split at source. It could also allow this split to be made available via a public ledger. 
Blockchain technology, then, could radically transform a culture of ‘black boxes’ and 
non-disclosure agreements, bringing transparency throughout the value chain. 
Heap’s ‘Tiny Human’ track provides a sense of how this might work. The splits 
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earned by musicians who performed on the track, together with other contributors 
such as the mastering engineer, have been posted on the Ujo website. Such a public 
recognition of the contribution of these session musicians, whose biographies are 
also included on the site, also has the advantage of acknowledging their ‘moral right’ 
to be credited for creative work. Heap also disclosed some details of the deal she 
made with Sennheiser, who featured the song for marketing purposes.  
 
The sense of transparency contributes to the sense of blockchain enabling a ‘fair 
trade’ era for recorded music, a term used by both Heap and Pledge Music CEO and 
co-founder Benji Rogers, another advocate of blockchain techology. Yet it is worth 
noting that transparently entrepreneurial musicianship, for instance of the sort seen 
in crowdfunding campaigns, can bring its own challenges (Beaven 2015). Even cellist 
Zoe Keating, an advocate of blockchain technology who posts detailed royalty 
statements on her website, acknowledges that not all musicians would be happy to 
be so transparent about their earnings: ‘I found that just like record labels, unaffiliated 
artists don’t always want transparency either. Why? Because, across the board, from 
the bottom to the top, the music industry is built on people pretending to be bigger 
than they really are’ (Howard 2015c). 
 
The nexus of control   
 
Benkler (2006) notes that the most important aspect of the networked information 
economy is the possibility it opens for reversing the ‘control’ focus of the twentieth-
century industrial information economy. Blockchain technology could enable a new 
stage in the ‘direct-to-fan’ model, allowing artists not only to sell recorded music 
directly to fans but to set their own prices. Similarly, they could set their own terms 
for the usage of the tracks they release, perhaps allowing them to be used under 
certain conditions on the model of Creative Commons – but, in this instance, 
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enforced by smart contracts and with the bonus of secure attribution. This would 
have a dramatic effect on the degree of creative control enjoyed by artists since, for 
all the rhetoric about the empowerment of artists, there is a lack of flexibility in the 
record industry at present.  
 
The ability for artists to set their own prices and terms of use could bring challenges 
as well as benefits, particularly given the lack of precedent. As Bartlett (2015) asks 
rhetorically: ‘What constitute a “fair” amount under the revenue share model? No-one 
really knows.’ There could also be significant consequences in terms of artistic 
identity and self-perception: despite the rhetoric of do-it-yourself models and self-
releasing, a disassociation between the creative and the commercial, between 
artistic and entrepreneurial identities, remains prominent (Warren 2004; Beaven 
2013). To an extent a hangover from the second half of the twentieth century, the 
dichotomy could be understood to have its origins much earlier, in the Romantic era. 
A strain of Romanticism may be evident in music fans too; evidence that an 
‘underground’ artist has received a considerable sum for a ‘sync’ deal, for instance, 
might lead to accusations of ‘selling out’.  
 
Disintermediation 
Perhaps the most radical – and controversial – aspect of how blockchain technology 
could affect the record industry relates to its potential for disintermediation. As Wright 
and De Filippi (2015) put it, blockchain technology ‘has the potential to decentralise 
the way we store data and manage information, potentially leading to a reduced role 
for one of the most important regulatory actors in our society: the middleman’ (p6).  
 
Blockchain technology has been seen by some as removing the need for 
performance rights organizations: in the scenario of a taco restaurant owner making 
a deal directly with the Texas Tornados, for instance, Howard (2015d) believes ‘there 
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will be no need for intermediaries such as ASCAP, BMI, Harry Fox, SoundExchange 
et al.’ Ujo  founder Phil Barry also suggests that the approximately 12.7% of royalties 
that currently disappear on the operating costs of a performing rights society could, 
through the adoption of blockchain technology, be made available to artists and 
record labels (Gottfried 2015b). Though it is true that PROs look particularly 
vulnerable to the disintermediation that distributed ledgers could bring about, 
however, others have pointed out – in terms of their UK equivalents, PRS and PPL – 
that no-one else would have their ability to negotiate with large bodies such as the 
BBC. Heap (private conversation 16.11.15) insists that there is still a role for record 
labels and music publishers in a post-blockchain world; indeed, she recently signed 
with independent publisher Downtown Music, who could play a part in Mycelia. 
Rogers (2015) states that blockchain technology could benefit labels, publishers 
PROs and streaming and download platforms, as well as artists, songwriters, 
musicians and fans.  
 
Evans (2014) states that public ledger currency platforms will tend to lead to the 
emergence of the same kinds of firms, with the same kinds of regulatory and 
consumer protection issues, as have traditionally existed in the financial services 
sector (p1). In terms of recorded music, similarly, the same tasks would need doing, 
from manufacture and distribution to marketing, press and radio plugging; if artists 
were unable or unwilling to do these jobs, third parties will presumably still be 
required. The role of these third parties, however, might change: a music publisher, 
for instance, might be obliged to concentrate on curation rather than collection. 
Revenue splits are likely to change too: Heap suggests that a label, for instance, 
might take as little as 5%, a dramatic reduction even for a typical independent label.  
 
If the extent of disintermediation that blockchain technology could bring about is 
disputed, what is more certain is that smart contracts would change the whole 
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structure of payments: no longer passing from one middleman to the next but, rather, 
split almost instantly according to agreed percentages. The diagrams below reflect 
how blockchain technology could simplify the process. (Note: they relate to streaming 
only. To understand that radio plays, CD purchases and download purchases all 
work slightly differently, as do syncsix, is to begin to understand the enormous 
complexity of the current system. My intention here is simply to sketch out the 
potential for blockchain technology to change the payment flow; various barriers to 
the adoption of this technology are addressed in the concluding section.) 
 
Streaming licensing and royalties: the current model (Cooke 2015) 
 
Recording
rights
Record label licenses rights to 
platform, then pays revenue 
share to featured artist
Publishing 
rights
Publishers may license direct, 
in partnership with CMOs, in 
which case the publisher pays 
royalty on reproduction right 
income to songwriter
OR publisher may license 
collectively, via CMOs, in which 
case the CMO either pays 
100% of reproduction rights to 
publisher (who pays royalty to 
songwriter) or CMO pays share 
to songwriter and share to 
publisher
In both cases, CMO pays 50% 
of performing rights to 
songwriter and 50% to 
publisher - minus commission -
although publisher may pass 
additional cut to songwriter
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Streaming licensing and royalties: the networked record industry model 
 
 
Possible futures  
 
Blockchain technology has been the subject of considerable attention of late, and it is 
perhaps unsurprising that there are those who suggest that it cannot live up to the 
hype. Certainly, a number of issues remain unresolved. Firstly, there are issues 
relating to the underlying cryptocurrencies, from the legal and regulatory (Guadamuz 
and Marsden 2015) to the ethical (Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2015). Dealing 
specifically with Bitcoin, Richter et al (2015) draw on Guo and Chow (2008) to outline 
five ongoing dangers: security threats; the danger of virtual money system collapse; 
the impact of real-world monetary systems; money laundering, tax evasion and 
criminal activity; and the value fluctuation of virtual money. There is also an issue 
with throughput and scalability, which groups such as Bigchain DB are attempting to 
address. Walport (2016) adds two more challenges: suspicion based on the strong 
association of blockchain technology with Bitcoin, associated with ‘dark web’ sites 
such as the now defunct Silk Road, and challenges relating to the terminology. 
Recording 
rights
Split at source between streaming 
platform, featured artist and third 
parties: record label, session 
musicians, producer, engineer, 
photographer, charity etc. Percentages 
likely to change in artists' favour.
Publishing 
rights
Split at source between songwriter and 
third parties (publisher, CMO, 
photographer, charity etc. Again, 
percentages likely to change in artists' 
favour.
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Certainly, in terms of network effects (Luther 2015), the fact that some platforms 
require payment in a given digital currency is limiting adoption. Ujo plans to make 
credit card payments possible, but to buy Heap’s ‘Tiny Human’ through their site 
required payment in the cryptocurrency Ether – one reason, presumably, why income 
from the track via Ujo has so far been low.x 
 
Secondly, there are issues that emerge from the very immutability of distributed 
ledger technology. What happens if erroneous information is entered onto the 
blockchain? Wright and De Filippi (2015) suggest that a new subset of law, which 
they term Lex Cryptographia, will be required to address smart contracts and 
decentralised autonomous organisations. Other related questions emerge too. Who 
enters the data? The blockchain, after all, is only as good as the information it 
contains. And what about back catalogue releases? It is much easier to see how 
blockchain technology might work for an emerging artist yet to sign a record or 
publishing deal, for instance, than how it could be applied to back catalogue owned 
by a major label.  
 
Thirdly, the process of disintermediation that blockchain technology could enable is 
likely to be resisted by those intermediaries themselves. Distributed ledger 
technology, as Godsiff (2016) points out, threatens the role of trusted intermediaries 
in positions of control within a hierarchy. And as Benkler (2006) states, the twentieth-
century producers of information, culture and communication – he specifically 
mentions the recording industry – can hardly be expected to roll over and accept 
their fate (pp 379-80). Transparency throughout the value chain may be in the 
interests of artists, but intermediaries may benefit from the opacity of data currently 
provided to artists (Rethink Music 2015, p3). The very lack of trust that could make 
the contribution of blockchain technology so valuable will itself have to be overcome 
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in order to achieve the co-operation required to place the relevant information on the 
blockchain in the first place.  
 
Even if the adoption of blockchain technology does not bring about disintermediation 
on the scale some predict, so that there is still a place, for instance, for labels, 
publishers, and PROs, the complexity of the current system will take some unpicking. 
Smart contracts may execute instantaneously, but a colossal amount of time will be 
required to set them up.  
 
It is far from certain, then, that the changes blockchain technology could bring about 
will actually occur. It is not even certain which blockchain or blockchains will gain 
market dominance, the lead contenders at the moment being either Bitcoin (and 
related blockchains) and Ethereum. It may even be that the future lies in ‘hybrid’ 
platforms such as OCL, or One-Click License, which clears usage rights for any 
media (thus allowing legal remixes and ‘mash-ups’) and encourages micropayments 
for content via a combination of blockchain and centralised technologies. Neither is it 
certain that all changes in a networked record industry would be positive: some 
champion the potential for disintermediation, but one man’s efficiency may be 
another’s lost job.  
 
Blockchain technology does, however, at least offer the potential of a truly networked 
record industry, allowing artists and songwriters to benefit from claiming authorship 
and attribution; to use metadata to ease licensing; to transfer assets and track 
provenance; and to facilitate frictionless, near-instant micropayments. These benefits 
could bring about a more transparent value chain for recorded music, a dramatic 
increase in the speed of royalty payments, and a considerable boost to artistic 
control. And although this article has focused primarily on recorded music, 
blockchain technology also has the potential to make positive changes in related 
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areas, for instance tracking the provenance of individual musical instruments – 
something String Hub are exploring – or enabling smart ticketing for live 
performances. Given the ‘prophetic’ qualities of music noted by Attali, the relevance 
to other creative industries is clear: from visual images used without attribution to 
journalism now legally consumed for free for any site not hidden behind a paywall, 
they face the same issues of non-rivalrous goods and zero marginal costs. 
 
For the media and visual arts, as well as for music, then, blockchain technology 
presents an ‘extraordinary array of opportunities’ (Walport 2016, p10). Others 
(Guadamuz and Marsden 2015; Pilkington 2015; Baur et al 2015; Richter et al 2015; 
Gosdiff 2016) agree that the technology is revolutionary, ushering in a paradigm shift 
and ultimately causing ‘major changes in the way in which the economy and society 
itself is organised and governed’ (Gosdiff 2016, p52). Wide-ranging and potentially 
transformative applications of blockchain technology have already emerged, from the 
digitised land registry in Hondurasxi to the government database of citizen and 
business data in Estonia, now the most regularly used Public Key Infrastructure in 
the world. In the creative industries, the potential of distributed ledgers is being 
explored in a range of contexts, from recording ownership of visual images 
(Monegraph, Ascribe) to increasing transparency in supply chains (Provenance, 
Block Verify).  
 
This is a highly dynamic, emerging field, and the pace of change is dramatic. It also 
needs to be seen in the context of broader shifts and trends. Benji Rogers, for 
instance, sees blockchain technology as likely to achieve prominence via a surge in 
the popularity of virtual realityxii. There is also congruence with the so-called internet 
of things, with companies such as Slock exploring the crossover potential, even with 
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what Mason (2015) see as an emerging ‘postcapitalism’ fuelled by developments in 
information technologyxiii.  
 
No doubt, some claims for blockchain technology are inflated, while considerable 
barriers to adoption certainly remain. In terms of recorded music, we are only at the 
start of the potential transformation: several of the platforms mentioned above are 
already operational, at least in beta form, but Heap’s ambitious Mycelia project, for 
instance, is still very much a ‘work in progress’. Yet distributed ledgers do offer at 
least the potential for radical change, such that the challenge now is one of business 
and economic models, rather than technology. It is also one of communication, both 
to the general public – to whom ‘fair trade’, for instance, might mean more than 
‘blockchain technology’ or ‘distributed ledgers’ – and to industry figures, for many of 
whom blockchain technology currently represents either empty buzz or an actual 
threat. If there could, indeed, be an ongoing place for publishers, record labels and 
PROs in the networked record industry, the fact needs to be communicated 
(although anecdotally there is evidence of streaming platforms and PROs already 
taking an interest in the potential of distributed ledgers). To overcome the husk of the 
industrial information model will require co-operation between all stakeholders, not 
just songwriters and artists, although it will quite possibly take at least one very high-
profile artist as well, as is demonstrated by the success of Taylor Swift in standing up 
to Apple Music.xiv  
 
Not everyone will benefit from a shift to a networked record industry; it might not 
even be welcomed by all artists and songwriters. Overall, however, the potential 
benefits, especially but not only to those creating the music, seem overwhelming. 
That the agent of change would be peer-to-peer digital networks – just like Napster, 
which arguably got recorded music into its current mess – creates an appealing 
sense of coming full circle.  
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i A ‘mash-up’ combine two or more tracks in an audio collage 
ii A ‘shred’ is a pastiche or parody video, often adding a new soundtrack to an 
existing performance clip 
iii The genesis block is the first block in the blockchain 
iv The name is widely considered to be a pseudonym (Barber et al 2012), possibly for 
a group of developers (Böhme et al 2015; Coeckelbergh and Reijers 2015) 
v ‘Miners’ provide computing resources to the network, rewarded through processing 
fees or digital currency  
vi Although those music platforms making use of blockchain technology are 
sometimes presented as homogenous, there are various differences, not least in the 
actual choice of blockchain: Peertracks uses the MUSE blockchain, while Ujo uses 
Ethereum. Bittunes currently favours the Bitcoin blockchain but describes itself as 
‘digital currency agnostic’.  
vii A Satoshi is 1/100,000,000th of a bitcoin 
viii Another advantage of using blockchain technology for crowdfunding campaigns is 
that smart contracts remove concerns about what returning pledge contributions if 
the stated target is not reached.  
ix The synchronisation of music and moving images, instance use on films, adverts 
and video games 
x A total of $128.40, according to the Ujo website, last accessed 31.03.16  
xi The potential of blockchain technology for secure land registries in developing 
nations has been pointed out recently by Hernando de Soto. A comment by de Soto 
(2001), made in the very different context of barriers to the adoption of capitalism in 
developing nations, is relevant to the challenge faced by the creative industries as 
outlined above: ‘The crucial point to understand is that property is not a physical 
thing that can be photographed or mapped… Property is not the assets themselves 
but a consensus between people as to how those assets should be held, used and 
exchanged’ (p164).  
xii Rogers’ proposal is to allow virtual reality companies to use only tracks with a .bc 
(‘blockchain’) codec 
xiii Rifkin (2014) also sees the ‘internet of things’, and zero marginal costs, as having 
the potential to bring about the eclipse of capitalism  
xiv The championing of blockchain technology by Heap has already been galvanising: 
she has two million followers on Twitter, as of March 2016, and has won two 
Grammy awards. The fact that the second of these awards was for a collaboration 
with Taylor Swift suggests that the involvement of Swift herself as an advocate of 
blockchain technology is not inconceivable.  
                                                        
